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Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234
(D.C. Cir. 2018)
Daniel M. Brister
Due to advances in climate science and an increased
understanding of coal’s role as a greenhouse gas, Appellant conservation
organizations sued the Secretary of Interior for failing to supplement the
1979 Programmatic EIS for the Federal Coal Management Program. The
D.C. Circuit Court held neither NEPA nor the APA required a
supplemental EIS and that the court lacked jurisdiction to compel the
Secretary to prepare one. Expressing sympathy for the Appellants’
position, the D.C. Circuit took the unusual step of offering advice to future
plaintiffs on how they might succeed on similar claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke addressed
whether the United States District Court for the District of Columbia erred
in holding that an updated review of the Federal Coal Management
Program (“Coal Program”) was not required under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative Procedures
Act (“APA”).1 The Western Organization of Resource Councils and
Friends of the Earth (“Appellants”) argued that the Secretary of the Interior
(“Secretary”) was required to supplement the 1979 Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (“PEIS”) for the Coal Program as a result
of advances in climate science and improved understanding of the role of
coal combustion as the single greatest source of atmospheric greenhouse
gas emissions.2
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that NEPA did not require the Secretary to update the PEIS because
the 1979 final approval of the Coal Program constituted the only “major
Federal action” and no further review was necessary in the absence of any
new action.3 The D.C. Circuit also rejected Appellants’ contention that
commitments to supplement the PEIS made in the Coal Program’s
implementing regulations created a legally binding obligation for
supplementation of the 1979 PEIS even if NEPA did not require it.4 While
the statements “might have created a binding duty on the agency at one
point,” to supplement the 1979 PEIS, subsequent amendments to the
implementing regulations in 1982 released the Secretary from any duty
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that may have arisen under the language of the original regulations beyond
those specifically mandated by NEPA.5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the 1970's, the Secretary commenced a series of administrative
actions to establish a comprehensive planning system for the granting and
administration of coal leases. These regulations became known as the
Federal Coal Management Program and provided a means for the Bureau
of Land Management (“BLM”) to be more proactive in the processing of
lease applications.6 In 1979, the Secretary, acting through the BLM, issued
a PEIS for the Coal Program pursuant to NEPA.7 In July of that year, the
BLM issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) officially adopting the Coal
Program.8 The BLM amended the Coal Program’s implementing
regulations in 1982 and issued a corresponding supplement to the PEIS in
1985.9 The PEIS has not been supplemented since.10
In 2014, Appellants sued the Secretary of Interior and other
Interior officials in district court seeking an order compelling the Secretary
to supplement the PEIS for the Coal Program due to the changed
circumstances represented by new science.11 In granting the Secretary’s
motion to dismiss, the district court held that the BLM had “no duty to
supplement the 1979 programmatic EIS for the federal coal management
program because there is no remaining or ongoing major federal action . .
.”12 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision.13
While the appeal was pending in 2016, Interior Secretary Sally
Jewell froze all new Coal Program leases while the agency prepared a
supplemental PEIS.14 According to Secretary Jewell, advances in climate
science required, “. . . a more comprehensive, programmatic review.”15
With new leases on hold while the Secretary prepared the supplemental
PEIS, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a joint motion asking the D.C. Circuit
to hold the case in abeyance, which it did.16
Jewell’s replacement, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke, lifted the
moratorium in March of 2017, and ordered the immediate cessation of all
work on the supplemental PEIS.17 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit granted
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Appellants’ motion to rescind the abeyance and set a briefing schedule for
the case.18
III. ANALYSIS
The Appellants asserted that NEPA required the Secretary to issue
a supplemental PEIS addressing climate change related impacts of the
Coal Program.19 Since NEPA does not provide a mechanism for private
citizens to sue to enforce its provisions, the Appellants asserted their claim
under a specific provision of the APA. The D.C. Circuit therefore
reviewed the Secretary’s compliance under APA § 706(1), which states
“reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.”20 Appellants requested that the D.C. Circuit order
the Secretary to supplement the PEIS to remedy the Department of
Interior’s failure to act.21
Appellants relied upon two arguments they claimed compel the
Secretary to supplement the PEIS.22 First, they pointed to the
supplementation requirements in the regulations promulgated by the
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), which is the federal agency
charged with administering NEPA.23 Second, they referred to statements
the Secretary included in the original PEIS and ROD committing to update
the environmental analysis if circumstances changed.24 In both the ROD
and the PEIS, the Secretary promised that the PEIS “would be updated
when conditions change sufficiently to require new analyses of those
impacts."25
The D.C. Circuit held that neither argument mandated the
Secretary to update the PEIS.26
A. NEPA and CEQ Regulations
CEQ regulations require an agency to supplement an EIS to
account for “significant new . . . information relevant to environmental
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.”27 Appellants
claimed that recent advances in climate science, which were unavailable
at the time the original PEIS was written, constituted new information
under CEQ regulations.28 The Secretary did not disagree with Appellants’
contention that the analysis of coal’s impact on climate change in the
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original PEIS was outdated. Rather, the Secretary argued that no
supplementation was mandated because no new action had occurred or
was being proposed.29
In support of their position, Appellants cited the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council.30 In Marsh, environmental groups sued to stop a dam under
construction on a tributary of Oregon’s Rogue River.31 While the
construction was ongoing, new information emerged that had not been
available when the project’s EIS was written.32 The Court promulgated a
two-part test to determine whether the Department has a duty to
supplement an EIS, and require an agency to take a “hard look” at the
environmental impacts of an action when (1) a “major federal action”
remains to be carried out and (2) new information reveals that this
remaining action will have significant environmental impacts in a manner
or extent not yet considered.33 The Supreme Court in Marsh agreed with
the environmental groups’ assertions that the dam’s ongoing construction
work constituted a “major Federal action” yet to occur, and explained that
new information could force an agency to supplement an EIS when
“remaining governmental action would be environmentally
‘significant.’”34
The Appellants argued the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Marsh,
combined with new climate change data, and the Coal Program’s ongoing
approval of individual leases mandated the completion of a new EIS.35
Appellants further argued the PEIS required supplementation under Marsh
because the remaining governmental action of approving individual coal
leases would be environmentally significant.36 The D.C. Circuit disagreed,
citing the facts of a different United States Supreme Court case, Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), as being more on point.37
In SUWA, environmental groups sought to compel the BLM to supplement
an EIS involving a regulatory program (Wilderness Study Areas).38 The
groups argued that NEPA required the Agency to prepare a supplemental
EIS in response to changed conditions resulting from increased off-roadvehicle use.39 In its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the “major
Federal action” in the Wilderness Study Areas project had been completed
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upon the “approval of a land use plan[,]” and therefore, found neither an
“ongoing ‘major Federal action’ nor a corresponding duty to
supplement.”40
In Marsh, the duty to supplement hinged on identifying the
specific major federal action and the moment it was rendered complete.41
The Supreme Court held that the action was the in-progress construction
of the dam.42 The major Federal action identified by the Supreme Court in
SUWA was the adoption of a comprehensive land use plan which was held
completed at the moment it was finalized.43 Relying on SUWA, the D.C.
Circuit held that there no longer remained an outstanding major federal
action, as adoption of the overarching Coal Program, rather than the
ongoing approval of individual leases, constituted the major federal action
under NEPA.44 According to the D.C. Circuit, the Secretary’s approval of
the Coal Program in 1979 constituted the only major Federal action
requiring NEPA analysis.45
B. The Department’s Prior Statements
Appellants alternatively argued that even if supplementing the
PEIS was not mandated under NEPA, the agency made a binding
commitment to do so in the 1979 PEIS and ROD.46 The D.C. Circuit
agreed that those documents did create certain obligations for the
Secretary at the time of their issuance, as evidenced by statements that the
PEIS “would be updated when conditions change sufficiently to require
new analyses of those impacts.”47 However, the statements’ omission from
the 1982 revision to the Coal Program “. . . made clear that [the
Department] did not intend to bind itself to any supplementation duty
beyond that imposed by NEPA.”48
IV. ALTERNATE AVENUES AVIALABLE TO APPELLANTS
In its decision, the D.C. Circuit took the unusual step of offering
advice to potential future plaintiffs on how they might achieve their goals
through alternate means.49 Proposing “several avenues” by which
plaintiffs might “raise their claims regarding the climate-change
implications of coal leasing,” the D.C. Circuit suggested they file a rule
making petition requesting the Secretary consider the significant
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environmental impacts of the Coal Program in the regulations.50
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit suggested Appellants could challenge the
approval of individual coal leases on the grounds that their specific EISs
fail to consider the cumulative climatological effects of coal leasing. 51 If
the Secretary then attempted to tier the analysis to the PEIS for the Coal
Program, the PEIS could be challenged as being “too outdated to support
new federal action.”52 In her Concurrence, Circuit Judge Karen Henderson
opined that it was unnecessary and inappropriate for the D.C. Circuit to
identify such alternate litigation strategies.53
V. CONCLUSION
In holding that neither NEPA nor the agency’s own stated
commitments compelled the Secretary to undertake a supplemental PEIS
for the Coal Program, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order
of dismissal.54 While ultimately rejecting the Appellants’ claims, the D.C.
Circuit noted the “Appellants raise[d] a compelling argument that the
Secretary should now revisit the issue [climate change] and adopt a new
program or supplement its PEIS analysis.”55 Going even further, the D.C.
Circuit set out specific recommendations for how a future plaintiff might
successfully litigate on similar claims.56 While the D.C. Circuit may have
been sympathetic to the Appellants’ goals, its restrictive holding makes it
more difficult to challenge a PEIS as a result of changed circumstances
and reinforces the difficulty of challenging an “agency’s failure to
consider the cumulative climate impacts of federal coal leasing.”57
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